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fery D. Schall & Francis X. Shen, The Case of the Murdering Brain,
in LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 41–67 (2014). 
2. Daniel A. Martell, Causal Relation Between Brain Damage and
Homicide: The Prosecution, 1 SEMINARS IN CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHIA-
TRY 184 (1996).
3. Norman Relkin et al., Impulsive Homicide Associated with an Arach-
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SEMINARS IN CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHIATRY 172 (1996).
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5. Zachary Weiss, The Legal Admissibility of Positron Emission Tomog-
raphy Scans in Criminal Cases: People v. Spyder Cystkopf, 1 SEMI-
NARS CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHIATRY 202 (1996). 
6. Id.
7. Weinstein, 591 N.Y.S.2d 715.
8. In this paper, the radiotracer used in PET scanning is 18F-FDG.
The term PET will signify 18F-FDG PET.   
9. For a detailed explanation of how a PET scanner measures glucose
metabolism, see Susan E. Rushing & Daniel D. Langleben, Nuclear
Neuro-imaging, PET and SPECT, in 1 NEUROIMAGING IN FORENSIC
PSYCHIATRY: FROM THE CLINIC TO THE COURTROOM 3 (J. Simpson ed.,
2012). 
The People of the State of New York v. Herbert Weinstein(1992)1 is one of the earliest and most prominent exam-ples of an attorney offering a Positron Emission Tomog-
raphy (PET) scan as evidence in a criminal trial. Mr. Wein-
stein, a 68-year-old, married, Caucasian male worked in adver-
tising. Mr. Weinstein had no past criminal history and no his-
tory of violence, but he was accused of strangling his wife and
throwing her body from their 12th-story Manhattan apartment
to make her death appear to be a suicide. When confronted,
Mr. Weinstein admitted his guilt and even readily admitted his
attempts to cover up his crime.2 Mr. Weinstein’s lack of emo-
tion when discussing the crime and apparent lack of remorse
for his action caused his legal team to question whether the
older gentleman could be suffering from a neurological impair-
ment that caused an uncharacteristic act of aggression.3
Acts of aggression have been hypothesized to arise from
dysfunction within the prefrontal cortex and impaired connec-
tions between the frontal lobe and associated limbic brain
regions. Physicians consulting with Mr. Weinstein’s defense
attorneys suggested Mr. Weinstein undergo neuropsychologi-
cal testing and brain scanning that could demonstrate poten-
tial structural and/or functional deficits in his brain.4
An MRI of Mr. Weinstein’s brain revealed a large cyst in the
arachnoid mater, a protective lining that covers the brain tis-
sue. The arachnoid cyst was situated within the left sylvian fis-
sure and compressed the left frontal, temporal, and insular
regions of Weinstein’s brain. A functional scan of Mr. Wein-
stein’s brain demonstrated that the areas of brain tissue that
were compressed by the cyst were not metabolizing glucose at
the expected rate. Mr. Weinstein’s attorneys offered the PET
scan in support of a claim of not guilty by reason of insanity
(NGRI). Prosecutor Zachery Weiss moved for an order to pre-
clude Weinstein from offering any testimony or other evidence
concerning his PET scan. The prosecution argued that PET
scans were not accurate or reliable depictions of cerebral
metabolism.5 The prosecutor further argued that the idea that
hypometabolism in the frontal lobes causes frontal lobe dys-
function was not generally accepted in the psychiatric and
neurological community.6 Likewise, Weiss argued that it was
debatable whether a causal link could be established between
the presence of a congenital cyst and a single violent act. A
Frye hearing followed, and Judge Richard Carruthers consid-
ered whether the PET scan was generally accepted as a diag-
nostic instrument within the psychiatric and neurological
community.7
A PET scan measures brain function by determining the
brain’s use of glucose—the main energy source for the brain.
Brain cells, called neurons, need glucose to survive and to
function properly. In order to assess glucose metabolism, glu-
cose is radioactively labeled with a tracer. The most common
radiotracer in use today in PET scanning is 18F-fluo-
rodeoxyglucose (18F-FDG).8 FDG-PET is the only established
technique that allows analysis of brain glucose metabolism in
a live person. Before the PET scan, 18F-FDG is injected into
the vein of a patient who has previously been fasting. As the
radioactive glucose is metabolized by the brain, a pair of pho-
tons is emitted and captured by detectors within the PET
scanner through a process called co-incidental detection.9
The scanner records the number of times that photons are
captured. The resulting counts are used to calculate a meta-
bolic rate. The metabolic rates are displayed in color-coded
fashion in which metabolic increases are typically shown in
shades from yellow to red and metabolic decreases are shaded
from blue to purple. The 18F-FDG PET (FDG-PET) images
are used to determine sites of abnormal glucose metabolism
and can be used to characterize and localize brain abnormali-
ties.     
Edward Hoffman and Michael Phelps developed the PET
scanner in 1973, and techniques for diagnosing diseases in
humans soon followed. FDG-PET is an accepted clinical test
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used to diagnose and monitor cancer,10 epilepsy,11 and degen-
erative brain disease.12 FDG-PET is also used for pre-surgical
planning, in post-stroke evaluation,13 and for evaluation of
moderate to severe traumatic brain injury.14 PET is used by
forensic medicine practitioners to demonstrate diffuse axonal
injury, which is characteristic of mild traumatic brain injury.15
The similar single-photon emission computed tomography
(SPECT) is used to characterize neurodegenerative disorders
such as dementia, stroke, seizures, inflammation, and
trauma.16 SPECT uses the radioisotope technetium-99m
(99mTc), a compound with a much longer half-life than 18F-
FDG. The breakdown of 99mTc results in the emission of a sin-
gle photon. The imaging data is captured by a gamma camera,
which is rotated around the patient. The SPECT radioisotopes
are more accessible and less expensive than the PET radioiso-
topes, which must be produced in a specialized cyclotron and
used within hours of its production.  
Only since the early 1990s have courts been confronted
with admissibility questions regarding the use of nuclear med-
icine studies, including PET and SPECT technologies, in crim-
inal trials. The primary issue that judges consider is whether
the information provided by the scan will assist the jury in
determining an issue regarding the cognitive capacity of the
criminal defendant. This information is not given the same
level of relevance in every court phase. At sentencing in all
death-penalty cases, the jury must consider the defendant’s
cognitive and neuropsychological limitations. But during the
guilt phase of a criminal trial, brain imaging studies are gener-
ally offered to substantiate a diagnosis or to offer a causal link
between a brain-based abnormality and violent behavior. At no
point in a criminal trial can nuclear studies be used to deter-
mine whether the defendant committed the act in question.
And brain images cannot assist the jury in understanding the
emotional mindset of the defendant at the time of the crime.
However, nuclear medicine studies can demonstrate brain-
based abnormalities, which may suggest that a defendant had
a limited capacity for self-control.  
In Weinstein, the defendant
underwent a resting-state PET
protocol, and his brain’s meta-
bolic rate was compared to a
group of controls. The PET scan
demonstrated that Mr. Weinstein
had abnormally low levels of glu-
cose metabolism in the areas of
his brain that were compressed
by the cyst and in the brain
regions opposite to the cyst.
There was no doubt that the pres-
ence of the cyst altered Mr. Wein-
stein’s brain structure and func-
tion. However, the question
before the court was one of cau-
sation. Was there sufficient evidence to allow psychiatric and
neurological experts to testify that Mr. Weinstein’s brain abnor-
mality was related to his violent criminal behavior?  Further,
could a psychiatrist reasonably opine that Mr. Weinstein’s
abnormal brain function made him unable to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his action and therefore rendered him insane
as defined by the State of New York?  
Judge Carruthers found that the scientific community gen-
erally accepted that PET scans provide a reliable measure of
brain glucose metabolism. Judge Carruthers also noted that it
is generally accepted in the fields of psychiatry, psychology,
and neurology that the frontal lobes of the human brain con-
trol executive functions, including the abilities to reason and
to plan.17 The court accepted that damage to the frontal lobes
could cause cognitive impairment and that the impairment
could specifically be in the areas of judgment, insight, and
foresight. The defense planned to call a psychiatrist to testify
that, at the moment Weinstein allegedly killed his wife, his
cognitive impairment prevented him from understanding that
his conduct was wrong and that his impairment was in part
due to organic brain damage from the cyst. Judge Carruthers
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placed a limitation on the
defense witnesses’ testimony
and would not permit them to
opine either that the cyst or
reduced levels of glucose
metabolism in the frontal lobes
of the brain directly caused
Weinstein’s violence. 
Nevertheless, Judge Car-
ruthers noted that such asser-
tions would not be generally
accepted as valid in the fields of
psychiatry, psychology, and neu-
rology. He specifically noted that
the sensitivity and specificity of
frontotemporal hypometabolism
for impulsivity and violence is unknown. He noted that there
were no published controlled PET studies of either episodic vio-
lence or subarachnoid cysts, nor were there imaging studies of
cyst patients with and without incidents of violence. 
There is no legal record of how Weinstein’s insanity claim
fared before a jury because on the eve of trial he agreed to
plead guilty to manslaughter. Weinstein was sentenced to 7 to
21 years in prison. A surgeon can drain an arachnoid cyst;
however, there is a risk of reaccumulation of the cyst. Mr.
Weinstein did not undergo cyst drainage. He was incarcerated
for more than 12 years and did not engage in any violent acts
while in prison.18 He was granted a conditional release at age
79 and died 2 years after his release. More than 20 years later,
arachnoid cysts remain a common incidental finding in neuro-
radiologic studies. Arachnoid cysts can lead to epilepsy,
headache, and other neuropsychiatric impairment, but no
studies directly link this brain abnormality with violence.
PET IN CRIMINAL TRIALS: CURRENT TRENDS IN 
ADMISSIBILITY
Despite the acceptance of PET in the Weinstein case in 1992,
today there continues to be debate concerning the admissibil-
ity of FDG-PET and the appropriateness of expert witness tes-
timony discussing brain scans in the courtroom.19 This section
reviews the most prominent concerns about the introduction
of these brain scans into evidence and explains how the admis-
sibility calculus differs depending on the phase of the legal
proceeding. It will review the introduction of scans at pretrial
competency hearings and the guilt and sentencing phases of
criminal trials and conclude that courts are most willing to
admit brain-scan evidence at the sentencing phase.
Admission of PET at Pretrial Competency Hearings 
The standard for assessing competency to stand trial was set
out in Dusky v. United States20 and has since been adopted by
many state jurisdictions. Dusky requires that a defendant pos-
sess a reasonable capacity to understand the criminal process
and be able to function in that process. Mental illness, brain
injury, dementia, and mental retardation can significantly affect
these abilities. If a defendant is found incompetent to stand
trial, the trial is delayed until the defendant becomes competent
to respond to the charge. However, there are some conditions
that cannot be remedied, and therefore, neither the passage of
time nor treatment is likely to restore competence. In these
cases, the prosecutor may choose not to pursue certain charges
or may request that a defendant be committed to a mental facil-
ity to attempt to restore the defendant’s competence. 
The ultimate fate of incompetent defendants was addressed
in Jackson v. Indiana (1972).21 Jackson was a 27-year-old man
who suffered from an intellectual disability, deafness, and
muteness. He was unable to read, write, or otherwise commu-
nicate except through limited sign language. Jackson was
charged with theft of five dollars and a purse and its contents,
estimated to be worth four dollars. Mr. Jackson was not able to
communicate with his attorney, so his legal team sought assis-
tance from a teacher at the school for the deaf. The teacher
stated that Jackson did not possess adequate sign-language
skills for communication and that he would be unable to com-
prehend the proceedings or aid counsel due to his intellectual
disability. The State of Indiana had no facilities that could pro-
vide Jackson with rehabilitation for this form of incompetency,
and the Supreme Court found that indefinite commitment
would violate the defendant’s right to due process.22 The
Supreme Court stated that a defendant committed to a mental
facility solely on the basis of incompetency “cannot be held
more than the reasonable period of time necessary to deter-
mine whether there is a substantial probability that he will
attain that capacity in the foreseeable future.”23
Today forensic psychiatrists are routinely asked to evaluate
defendants’ competence to stand trial. If the physician deems a
defendant incompetent, the physician will be asked to predict
whether the defendant’s competence can be restored and what
sort of treatment may be necessary to accomplish restoration.
There will be cases in which it will be clear to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty that competence to stand trial can-
not be restored. In some cases, functional imaging may be part
of the medical workup to determine the severity of a brain-
based cause for incompetence.   
Competency is likely to be a growing concern as the popu-
lation ages. More than 3 million people living in the United
States suffer from dementia, a degenerative brain condition.24
As the population of Americans over age 65 is predicted to
double by 2030, the number of people with dementia—a risk
factor for violence— is also likely to dramatically increase.25
Dementia, including Alzheimer’s-type dementia, frontotem-
poral dementia (Pick’s Disease), and Parkinson’s disease, are
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currently irreversible and incurable. While medications may
slow the progression of these diseases, people with cognitive
deficits caused by these illnesses are not expected to regain lost
cognition. In cases of severe cognitive impairment that pre-
vents defendants from working with their defense attorneys,
findings of incompetence to stand trial are possible. FDG-PET
can be used to diagnose dementia.26 And depending on the
severity of the crimes, the prosecuting attorneys may require
more evidence to support the alleged irreversible diagnoses.
The following case provides an example of a PET scan that
showed organic brain dysfunction but failed to persuade a
court that a defendant was not competent to stand trial.
In United States v. Vincent Gigante, the mafia boss known as
“the Chin” claimed he was incompetent to stand trial for con-
spiracy and racketeering.27 Mr. Gigante was court ordered to
undergo a competence examination after his legal team
claimed he suffered from Alzheimer’s-type dementia. A PET
study was offered in support of this finding. The court admit-
ted the PET evidence but declined to rely upon it. The court
noted that the scan was of “excellent technical quality but
[offered] a number of difficulties in interpretation.” Specifi-
cally the court was concerned that the controls in the study
were not treated with the same psychotropic drugs as Mr.
Gigante.  
Defense witness Dr. Monte Buchsbaum of Mount Sinai
School of Medicine interpreted the PET scans and concluded
that Mr. Gigante was suffering from organic brain dysfunction,
possibly due to Alzheimer’s disease or multi-infarct dementia.
He believed Mr. Gigante was incapable of being tried. Neu-
ropsychological testing by Dr. Wilfred Van Gorp of New York
Hospital’s Cornell Medical Center also supported a diagnosis of
severe cognitive impairment. However, the prosecution’s
expert, Dr. Jonathan Brodie, a psychiatrist at New York Uni-
versity Medical School, testified that the results of both the
neuropsychological tests and the PET scan could have been
corrupted by medications that Mr. Gigante was taking. 
Dr. Brodie criticized defense experts for not analyzing the
defendant’s blood to determine the amount of medication in
his system at the time the tests were administered. Mr. Gigante
had been taking potent psychotropic medications for a long
period prior to the PET scan and did not stop these medica-
tions prior to the scan. The medications could have altered
blood flow to the brain or crossed the blood-brain barrier and
potentially altered metabolism.28 The members of the control
group were not medicated at the time of their scans and were
not close in age to Mr. Gigante. As a result, the court did not
find the results of the PET persuasive. Ultimately, Mr. Gigante
was found competent for sentencing and was sentenced to 12
years in federal prison in 1997. 
But PET scans have been admitted to support a pretrial
motion of incompetence to
stand trial. For example,
Miguel Carrizalez was charged
with two counts of murder, six
counts of attempted murder,
and gang-related charges in
California.29 Mr. Carrizalez had
sustained a gunshot wound to
the head and had a bullet
lodged in his brain. He claimed
incompetence to stand trial due
to this severe traumatic brain
injury and offered a PET scan
in support. The prosecution
objected to the admission of the PET scan, and the court held
a Kelly-Frye hearing.30 During the competence hearing, the
judge stated that PET studies are “generally accepted in the sci-
entific community and . . . are certainly accepted as tools used
in clinical settings. And in forensic settings it seems . . . there
could be testimony as to the areas of the brain that are relevant
to the issue of [trial competency].”31 The court admitted the
PET study into evidence. Despite evidence of severe traumatic
brain injury, Mr. Carrizalez was found competent to stand trial,
and the PET scan was presented again during the sentencing
phase of the trial. The jury convicted Mr. Carrizalez of all
charges but did not return a unanimous vote in favor of the
death penalty, a requirement to impose a death sentence in Cal-
ifornia. The district attorney did not retry the penalty phase,
and Mr. Carrizalez was sentenced to life without the possibil-
ity of parole. The defense teams’ multiple reminders to the jury
of the severity of Mr. Carrizalez’s brain injury both in the form
of expert testimony and by pictorial demonstration may have
led at least one juror to vote for life in prison rather than death
in this double-homicide trial.  
Admission of PET During the Guilt Phase of 
Criminal Trials 
In a capital case, neuroimaging can be used in two ways:
first, during the guilt-or-innocence phase in which the State
must prove a defendant committed an alleged crime beyond a
reasonable doubt, and second, in the penalty phase, where the
jury decides whether a guilty defendant will receive a capital
sentence. Admissibility challenges are far more likely to arise
when PET images are submitted for consideration in the guilt
phase of a criminal trial. During the guilt phase, PET may be
introduced to support a defendant’s claim that he has a brain-
based abnormality that affects his or her ability to form the req-
uisite mens rea for the charged crime. When a defense attorney
chooses to display a brain image in the guilt phase of a crimi-
nal trial, the image will almost certainly be presented by an
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expert, who will testify as to
whether the defendant was capa-
ble of forming the mens rea
needed to accomplish the crime.
To negate mens rea, the expert
must believe that a neurological
defect caused the defendant to be
unable to form the intent
required to constitute a crime. In
cases in which the expert plans to
testify that a neurological deficit
precludes mens rea, an eviden-
tiary challenge is likely. But when
the claim is diminished capacity
due to a neurological deficit, an
evidentiary challenge is less likely to arise. Evidentiary chal-
lenges are rarely raised when neuroimaging is presented in the
sentencing phase of trial. 
Legal and medical scholars alike have feared the effect that
images could have on a jury determining a defendant’s guilt.32
Critics fear a “Christmas tree effect,” whereby jurors may be
unduly influenced by the visual display of a colorful brain scan
and accept the scan as authoritative evidence without consid-
ering the merits of the expert’s accompanying testimony.33
Critics have also feared that the expert testimony interpreting
scans will prejudice or mislead the jury. Further, there is con-
cern that a jury will find a misshapen or malfunctioning brain
more persuasive than traditional forms of lay or expert testi-
mony.34 A study by Gurley and Marcus (2008) weighed the
effects of structural neuroimaging with MRI used in support of
an insanity defense in a simulated murder trial.35 In this study,
involving a sample of 400 mock jurors, jurors were more likely
to find a defendant not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) if
an MRI showing a brain lesion was presented than if no image
was presented. Mock jurors were even more likely to choose
NGRI when both expert testimony and neuroimaging was pre-
sented than when either type of evidence alone was presented.
This study suggested that the combination of expert testimony
and imaging can lead jurors to find that a defendant lacked the
mens rea needed to commit murder. 
However, in a mock study by Schweitzer, there were no
increases in successful mens-rea-specific defenses when brain
images were presented to the “jury.”36 In the research study,
brain images had no consistent impact on the verdicts or sen-
tences rendered by the mock jurors.37 Further, showing the
mock jurors neuroimages also had no impact on jurors’ per-
ceptions of the defendant’s criminal responsibility.38
Admissibility challenges are less likely to prevail if the
defense offers the incomplete defense of diminished capacity
or a variant thereof. When a defendant raises a diminished-
capacity defense, the defendant suggests that he or she was
deprived of a normal level of mental wherewithal at the time of
the crime. Not every state employs this partial defense. In
states that do, a successful plea of diminished capacity in a
murder trial would likely result in a charge of first- or second-
degree murder being reduced to manslaughter.
When introduced in the guilt phase of the trial, PET should
aid the physician in making a diagnosis. In some cases, the
court has required that PET demonstrate information that is
not otherwise available to the clinician. In People v. Goldstein,
the defendant, Andrew Goldstein, pushed Kendra Webdale in
front of an oncoming subway train, killing her.39 Both prose-
cution and defense experts agreed that defendant Goldstein
had schizophrenia. At issue in the trial was whether he was
insane at the time he pushed Kendra in front of the oncoming
train. PET was offered by a defense expert witness to show that
Goldstein’s brain imaging was consistent with schizophrenia.
Specifically, the defense witness planned to testify that Mr.
Goldstein had a massive reduction in metabolism in the frontal
lobe and the basal ganglia.40 A special master appointed by the
court stated that PET cannot conclusively prove schizophre-
nia. He continued that regardless of any brain abnormality that
PET could show, PET would not be probative of the key issue
of the insanity defense, namely, whether Mr. Goldstein com-
prehended either the nature and consequences of his actions or
that his actions were wrong. As PET was not offered to further
probe into the impact of schizophrenia on the defendant’s cog-
nition and behavior, it was excluded from evidence.41
In addition, an expert’s attempt to introduce PET to demon-
strate that a particular process or substance altered brain
metabolism can be risky if PET is not routinely used for such
a diagnosis. Michael Jackson (not the pop star), a man with a
history of phencyclidine (PCP) dependence, shot and killed
West Covina Police Officer Kenneth Wrede in 1983 when Jack-
son was intoxicated on PCP.42 Mr. Jackson admitted to shoot-
ing Officer Wrede but maintained that he had no recollection
of the encounter whatsoever.  Defense put forth a defense of
actual innocence under the theory that Mr. Jackson could not
form the requisite mens rea required to commit the crime of
first-degree murder. The defense expert offered a PET scan to
demonstrate brain damage secondary to chronic PCP abuse.
The prosecution expert testified that the use of PET scans to
diagnose chronic PCP abuse is not generally accepted by the
scientific community, and the defense expert did not dispute
this fact. No evidence was introduced to suggest that a PET
scan could prove that Jackson was unable to premeditate or
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form specific intent to kill at the time of the shooting. The PET
scan could not explain what effect PCP-induced brain damage
would have on Jackson’s capacity for higher thought. The
appeals court found that the trial court did not err in exclud-
ing the PET scan and found that Jackson failed to make the
required showing of probable innocence. 43
PET was also excluded from evidence in the case of U.S. v.
Montgomery.44 Lisa Montgomery had an online friendship with
her pregnant victim Bobbie Jo Stinnett. The two had engaged
in email exchanges about their respective “pregnancies.”
Montgomery arranged to meet Stinnett and buy a puppy from
her. Montgomery strangled the expectant mother, performed a
cesarean section, and kidnapped Stinnett’s premature baby.
Stinnett died, but her premature daughter survived. Mont-
gomery crossed state lines with the baby, making her crime a
federal offense. A PET scan was offered to support Mont-
gomery’s defense of pseudocyesis, or false pregnancy, a mental
disorder that could have led to a diminished-capacity finding.
The court found that a PET scan was not ever used as a diag-
nostic aid for pseudocyesis. Further, the abnormalities revealed
on PET did not predict behavior, nor did the abnormality cause
Montgomery to commit the crime. Accordingly, PET was
excluded from evidence in the guilt phase of the trial. In this
case PET was also excluded from evidence during the sentenc-
ing phase, but such exclusion at sentencing is exceedingly rare
in death-penalty cases. 
PET scans are also only admissible if unlikely to mislead the
jury. In United States v. Mezvinsky,45 Edward Mezvinsky, a for-
mer congressman, was charged with 69 violations of federal law
arising from fraudulent schemes and related financial crimes.
The crimes occurred over a 12-year period. In his defense, Mr.
Mezvinsky offered a PET scan to demonstrate that he was inca-
pable of deception, an element necessary to prove fraud. Dr.
Ruben Gur, the Government’s witness, and Dr. Jonathan Brodie,
Mr. Mezvinsky’s witness, agreed that no study exists that links
the diminished capacities in various parts of Mezvinsky’s brain
to any specific disorder. Both agreed that a PET scan is only a
snapshot of a patient’s brain at one particular time and that one
cannot make retrospective appraisals of that brain from such
snapshots. Thus, neither expert could make any inference
about the state of Mezvinsky’s brain at any point during the 12
years in question. Neither expert could identify anything in the
scan that would elucidate Mezvinsky’s capacity to deceive.46
Accordingly, the court found that the relevance of the evidence
was outweighed by its capacity to mislead the jury, and PET was
excluded from evidence in Mezvinsky’s trial. Such a result is
unlikely in the sentencing phase, however.
PET Admissions Rarely
Challenged at Sentencing
Phase 
The penalty phase arises
after the jury has found the
defendant guilty of the capi-
tal crime. To help the jury
determine whether a defen-
dant should be sentenced to
death, the State presents evi-
dence of aggravating factors
about the defendant and the
crime, and the defense presents evidence of mitigating fac-
tors. The penalty phase presents the jury with “the moral and
normative choice” of whether a capital defendant deserves
execution.47
PET scans are often admitted because criminal defendants
facing the death penalty have a constitutional right to present
any evidence at sentencing that could lead to a sentence less
than death. In Lockett v. Ohio (1978), the Supreme Court deter-
mined that a capital defendant is entitled to present any aspect
of character or record and any circumstance of the offense that
might serve as a basis for a sentence less than death, regardless
of whether the evidence supports a statutorily authorized mit-
igating factor.48 And in Tennard v. Dretke (2004), the Supreme
Court stated that any cognitive or neuropsychological impair-
ment may be considered a mitigating factor even if the impair-
ment bears no direct link with the homicidal behavior.49 Evi-
dence of a structural or metabolic brain abnormality could be
included as evidence of a severe mental disturbance, a prong
that most states and the federal government include as a miti-
gating factor in the death-penalty statute.50 Further, most
states allow a defendant to present any “other factor” in the
defendant’s background, record, or character or any other cir-
cumstance of the offense that mitigate against imposition of a
death sentence.51 Evidence of brain damage or brain dysfunc-
tion can be offered under the “other factor” prong as well.
Functional images of the brain are commonly admitted in
death-penalty litigation to demonstrate brain abnormalities
that a jury could find mitigating.52
The admission of PET to demonstrate brain abnormalities
has become routine during the penalty phase of capital trials in
several states. The right to present a PET scan in the state of
Florida was determined in Hoskins v. State.53 Mr. Hoskins was
charged with multiple felonies, including first-degree murder,
and the State sought the death penalty.54 Mr. Hoskins’s exam-
ining physicians noted that he had an IQ of 71 and recom-
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mended that PET be obtained as
part of the workup for brain
damage. The trial court refused
to grant the defendant’s motion
seeking to transport Hoskins to
a hospital for PET scanning. Mr.
Hoskins was convicted of first-
degree murder and sentenced to
death. The appellate court
remanded the case, ordering that
a brain scan be obtained and a
new penalty phase considered,
in effect overturning Hoskins’s
death sentence.55 The court’s
denial had limited the physi-
cian’s ability to evaluate the
degree of Hoskins’s mental impairment, which is a statutory
mitigating factor under Florida law.56
In most capital cases, the image of the defendant’s brain is
but one piece of evidence demonstrating the disadvantages
confronted by the defendant. A complete mitigation workup
will review the developmental, genetic, social, family, home
environment, educational, and vocational history of the defen-
dant. When evidence of brain damage or brain dysfunction has
not been explored during the original sentencing phase of a
capital trial, this oversight may be grounds for appeal.   
INEFFECTIVE-ASSISTANCE-OF-COUNSEL CLAIMS FOR
FAILURE TO EXPLORE BRAIN-BASED ABNORMALITIES  
As explained in the previous section, it appears that the use
of PET scans is growing, most rapidly in the sentencing phase
of criminal trials. Accordingly, some courts are now dealing
with the question whether an attorney should be required to
proffer a brain scan in some contexts. This section reviews this
emerging area of caselaw. While most of the time the use of a
brain scan is not warranted, the illustrative cases raise the pos-
sibilities that in some circumstances, an attorney’s failure to
gather brain data would be ineffective assistance of counsel.
The U.S. Supreme Court established a two-part test for inef-
fective assistance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington
(1984).57 A case may be remanded if a criminal defendant can
show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective stan-
dard of reasonableness and that counsel’s performance gave
rise to a reasonable probability that, if counsel had performed
adequately, the result of the trial or sentencing would have
been different.58
If an attorney fails to present mitigating evidence, including
evidence of mental illness or extreme emotional distress, the
case can be remanded for ineffective assistance of counsel. For
example, California defendant Fernando Caro’s death sentence
was vacated and remanded for re-trial because his attorney
failed to investigate and present evidence of the impact that
exposure to neurotoxicants and child abuse had on his brain.59
The court stated that attorneys must cast a wide net for all rel-
evant mitigating evidence at capital-sentencing hearings
because “the Constitution prohibits imposition of the death
penalty without adequate consideration of factors which might
evoke mercy.”60 The court did not state that neuroimaging was
required in Caro’s case. Rather, it gave an extensive list of cir-
cumstances that were likely to lead to brain damage. Caro
spent his childhood working and playing in pesticide-soaked
fields, and he bathed in and was fed food cooked in water con-
taminated with pesticides. The court noted that Caro worked
as a “flagger” for a crop-dusting company and at a company
that made toxic pesticides. He was regularly exposed to
organophosphates, solvents, organochlorines, and carbamates,
and he was poisoned by a number of toxic chemicals at the
plant. In addition, Caro suffered serious physical abuse and
head injuries as a result of horrific child abuse. Caro also sus-
tained several head injuries as a child: he was born with a
three-inch lump on his head due to the use of forceps during
his difficult delivery, a water cooler fell on his head at the age
of three, and he was hit by a car later that year.61
It is possible that testimony regarding these unfortunate cir-
cumstances would be adequate to allow a jury to sentence
Caro to life rather than death. However, if a psychiatrist were
to claim that these multiple neurologic insults caused brain
damage, evidence of damage would need to be submitted to
the court. The Caro court suggested that it is adequate for
counsel to obtain a corroborated injury history listing factors
that led to demonstrated cognitive impairment. But evidence
could also be presented through neuropsychological testing,
structural brain scans (MRI), and/or functional brain scans
(SPECT or PET).  
A California court also vacated a death sentence when an
attorney failed to consult a neurologist, neuropsychologist, or
psychiatrist regarding the defendant. In Francis Hernandez’s
case, the defense attorney failed to arrange a neurological exam
of Hernandez despite the fact that he wrote notes in his legal
file suggesting that he planned to do so. On appeal, the attor-
ney stated that “evidence of neurological impairment is the
type of evidence I wanted because it would have helped to
explain and mitigate Francis’s state of mind at the time of the
killings.”62
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
also determined that counsel’s failure to present this evidence
of brain-based abnormalities fell below the constitutional min-
imum standard for effective representation. Roderick Smith
murdered his wife and four step-children. His defense counsel
failed to present evidence of brain-based abnormalities includ-
ing “borderline mental retardation, mental illness, and organic
brain impairment” as mitigating evidence at trial. 63 The Tenth
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Circuit vacated his sentence, stating: “The sentencing stage is
the most critical phase of a death penalty case. Any competent
counsel knows the importance of thoroughly investigating and
presenting mitigating evidence.”64 We are cognizant of “the
overwhelming importance of the role mitigation evidence
plays in the just imposition of the death penalty.”65
A brain scan does not replace a thorough mitigation analy-
sis of a capital defendant, which should include the develop-
mental, genetic, social, family, home environment, educa-
tional, and vocational history of the defendant. But evidence of
brain deficit may arise from the mitigation analysis. If brain
injury or intellectual deficit is suspected, defense counsel must
have a qualified medical professional evaluate the defendant,
and the professional may request neuropsychological testing. If
physical examination or neuropsychological testing reveals
brain-based deficits, these deficits may be confirmed or further
characterized with brain imaging. The magnitude of the abnor-
mality detected by neuropsychological testing can assist an
expert in determining whether neuroimaging is likely to reveal
brain-based abnormalities. In some cases, experts may recom-
mend against obtaining costly brain images if they feel the
abnormalities that could be pictorially displayed by the images
will be minimal. In such cases, the prosecution is likely to
draw attention to the lack of abnormality.  
CONCLUSION 
The inner workings of a defendant’s mind are often a central
issue in each phase of criminal jurisprudence. However, differ-
ent standards apply for admission of scientific evidence during
the guilt phase and the penalty phase in criminal trials. In the
pretrial phase, attorneys may request the evaluation of a crim-
inal defendant for competence to stand trial. If a defendant is
found incompetent to stand trial, the examiner is asked to give
a diagnosis as to what caused the mental incapacity as well as
a prognosis for when and how competence can be restored. In
cases where a physician believes it will not be possible to
restore a defendant’s mental wherewithal due to brain damage,
a PET scan can help illustrate the brain-based abnormality that
the examiner detected. 
In the guilt phase of a criminal trial, PET may elucidate
damage to areas of the brain that are involved in cognitive
functions such as judgment and impulse control. Physicians
may use PET to corroborate their clinical impression of a
defendant. In some cases, prosecutors’ motions to exclude PET
evidence that challenge defense experts’ plans to present a
causal link between violence and brain damage have been suc-
cessful.66 But even in the face of evidentiary challenges, PET’s
colorful imagery of brain damage can be useful during trial or
in plea bargaining discussions, as in Weinstein.
At sentencing, brain-based deficits are a mitigating factor
for both capital and non-capital defendants. While there is not
yet an absolute mandate that brain-based deficits be consid-
ered in all criminal cases, the defendant’s cognitive and neu-
ropsychological limitations must be considered in capital
cases, even if the impairment bears no direct link with the
homicidal behavior.67 Accordingly, when PET is offered as mit-
igating evidence during the sentencing phase of a capital mur-
der trial, an admissibility challenge is unlikely. Failure to pre-
sent evidence of brain damage has been a factor in overturning
death sentences in ineffective-assistance-of-counsel cases. In
addition, evidence of brain damage could assist a jury in
understanding the defendant’s limitations, resulting in a lesser
sentence. 
When a judge has to decide whether to admit brain imag-
ing, the rules of evidence provide clear guidelines regarding
when and for what purposes such evidence can be introduced.
The judge will consider whether the defense is offering the
original scan or a comparison between the defendant’s scan
and other scans. In cases where an extrapolation has occurred,
the judge is the gatekeeper who must consider the reliability of
the methodology used in the interpretation of the brain image.
If scan methodology is determined to meet admissibility stan-
dards, then the judge will consider the reason why the scan is
being offered. Before trial, does the information demonstrated
by the scan assist the jury in determining the cognitive capac-
ity of the criminal defendant? At the guilt phase, will the brain
image assist the jury in deciding a fact at issue in the guilt-
innocence phase of trial? Is there sufficient evidence to allow
an expert to testify that a brain abnormality was related to vio-
lent or otherwise criminal behavior? During the sentencing
phase, does the scan assist the judge or jury in understanding
a particular deficit or disadvantage experienced by the defen-
dant? In this final phase, brain images are almost always per-
mitted to supplement the mitigation plea. In fact, in some
cases not providing PET scans or other evidence of any brain
abnormalities may be ineffective assistance of counsel.
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